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Abstract 
 
The Kangoye (2013, TDE) findings on the negative nexus between foreign aid unpredictability 
and governance could seriously affect debates in academic and policy making circles. Using the 
theoretical underpinnings of the celebrated Eubank (2012, JDS) literature, we first confirm 
Kangoye’s findings. Then extend the concept of governance from corruption to political, 
economic, institutional and general versions of the phenomenon. Findings from the extension run 
counter to those of Kangoye. It follows that in the presence of foreign aid uncertainty, 
governments could be constrained to improve governance standards in exchange for or 
anticipation of more dependence on local tax revenues. The empirical evidence is based on 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two direct policy implications result. First, the 
Kangoye findings for developing countries are relevant for Africa. Second, when the concept of 
governance is not restricted to corruption, the findings become irrelevant for the continent.  
JEL Classification: C53; F35; F47; O11; O55 
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1. Introduction 
  
 The Kangoye (2013) findings on the negative nexus between foreign aid unpredictability 
and governance could seriously affect debates in academic and policy making circles. The paper 
concludes: “This paper examines the effects of aid on governance from a different perspective by 
asserting that aid unpredictability can potentially increase corruption in recipient countries by 
providing incentives to risk-averse and corrupt political leaders to engage in rent-seeking 
activities. Analyses of data from 80 developing countries over the period 1984–2004 offer 
evidence that higher aid unpredictability is associated with more corruption as measured by a 
synthetic index. We also ﬁnd further evidence that this latter impact is more severe in countries 
with weak initial institutional conditions. These ﬁndings are a supplementary advocacy for the 
need for better management and better predictability of aid ﬂow in developing countries” (p. 
121). Our interest in the underlying paper is twofold:  restricted use of the concept of governance 
and a recently celebrated Eubank (2012) hypothesis. 
 First, restricting the concept of governance to corruption could be misleading. 
Accordingly, while corruption is employed as the dependent variable of interest, governance is 
used on the title. We recalibrate the concept of governance into political, economic and 
institutional dynamics. Consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010) as recently employed in the 
literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Andrés et al., 2014), governance is political (voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence), economic (governance effectiveness and 
regulation quality), institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) and general (political, 
economic and institutional). We use these governance dynamics in our study to extend the 
underpinning paper. 
 Second, after the Bottom Billion (Collier, 2007) and Dead Aid (Moyo, 2009), inter alia, 
that have been critically engaged in academic and policy making circles, the Eubank (2012) 
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Somaliland-based hypothesis has been recently celebrated with the best paper award from the 
Journal of Development Studies in 2013. Consistent with the author, the government depends on 
local taxpayers for revenue in exchange for better governance standards. Hence, according to the 
narrative, taxpayers have the leverage to demand for better governance standards. The theoretical 
underpinnings of the hypothesis are deeply rooted in the history of economic thought. It has 
foundations in negotiations between autocratic governments who needed tax income (to survive 
inter-state wars) and citizens who were willing only to consent to taxation if there was better 
governance and delivery of public commodities.  
 In light of the above, it is interesting to engage how the above two underpinning points 
converge to give substance to the motivation of this paper. Two main axes of convergence boldly 
standout: (1) Somaliland is not eligible for foreign aid but has relatively better governance 
standards and; (2) the Kangoye (2013) findings run counter to the intuition of Eubank (2012).  
 First, while Somaliland is not eligible to official development assistance, compared to 
other African nations, it has relatively better governance standards. The increased confidence of 
Somaliland government in light of the Eubank hypothesis could be summarized in stylized facts 
from Somaliland’s minister of energy and minerals. At a recent African mining conference 
Hussein Abdi Dualeh professed that his country did not need foreign aid because it was better-off 
without it:  “That is a blessing in disguise. Aid never developed anything…Aid is not a panacea, 
we’d rather not have it….How many African countries do you know that developed because of a 
lot of aid? It’s a curse. The ones that get the most aid are the ones with the problems….We’ve 
been left to our own devices. We are our own people and our own guys. We pull ourselves up by 
our own bootstraps. We owe absolutely nothing to anybody. We would not change hands with 
Greece today. We have zero debt” (Stoddard, 2014).  
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 Second, the Kangoye findings for developing countries run counter to the Eubank 
hypothesis which has recently been confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014a). Accordingly, foreign 
aid uncertainty could be assimilated to a situation where domestic government starts anticipating 
of resorting to more local tax revenues to compensate for the potential negative gap in foreign 
aid. Hence, the State should be predisposed to improving its governance standards in exchange 
for or anticipation of more local tax income. The Eubank hypothesis come-in at this juncture. 
Unfortunately, the Kangoye findings have suggested the contrary. We address this puzzle by 
postulation that the contradiction is based on the limited scope of the concept of governance, 
which is restricted to corruption. Hence, we hypothesize that the Eubank hypothesis might be 
confirmed in more exhaustive contexts of political, economic, institutional and general 
governance.  
 The procedure of verifying our postulations consists of three main steps. First, we confirm 
the Kangoye findings with the concept of corruption as the main indicator of governance. 
Second, we extend the conception of governance to political, economic, institutional and general 
dimensions using the six principal government quality dynamics, notably: political stability and 
voice & accountability (political); government effectiveness and regulation quality (economic); 
corruption-control and rule of law (institutional); and general (political, economic & 
institutional). Third, we replicate the approach that has confirmed the Kangoye findings to assess 
if his results are confirmed in the broader spectrum of governance. In other words, if the Eubank 
intuition is validated.  
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the 
methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
  
 We examine a sample of 53 African countries using annual from African Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. While the data of Kangoye ranges from 
1984 to 2004, good governance indicators from the World Bank only date from 1996. The focus 
on the African continent has a twofold justification. It is: (1) consistent with developing countries 
to which the findings of Kangoye are relevant and; (2) in line with the Eubank (2012) hypothesis 
which has been postulated and confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014a).  
 The dependent variables are measured in terms of the corruption perception index (CPI) 
and governance dynamics (political, economic, institutional and general). While the CPI is used 
in baseline analysis to confirm the Kangoye findings, governance dynamics are employed to 
verify if the findings are valid with an exhaustive conception of governance in light of the 
Eubank hypothesis. The governance variable are obtained from principal component analysis 
(PCA) discussed in Section 3.2 below.  
 The independent variable of interest is net official development assistance (NODA). In 
order to add subtlety to the analysis for robustness purposes, we add: (1) NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (NODADAC) and; (2) NODA from Multilateral Donors 
(NODAMD). The distortions are computed using two approaches: (1) simple standard deviations 
of three-year intervals and; (2) standard errors or standard deviations of the saved residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes in the NODA dynamics. The latter approach is consistent 
with Kangoye.  
 The choice of three non-overlapping intervals (NOI) has a fourfold justification.  First, 
one degree of freedom is lost after computation of residuals in the first-order autoregressive 
process and at least two periods are needed for standard deviations of the residuals to be further 
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computed. Second, averages mitigate short-run or business cycle disturbances that may loom 
substantially large. Third, 3 year NOI ensure that the basic conditions for the employment of 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) are well satisfied (N>T: 53>5). Fourth, 3 year NOI 
restrict overidentification or limit instrument proliferation by ensuring that the number of cross-
sections are higher than the number of instruments.  
 We control for inflation, trade openness, economic prosperity and government 
expenditure. Whereas the role of government expenditure is consistent with fiscal behavior in 
governance (Eubank, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013), globalization in terms of trade openness has 
been documented to improve governance (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Asongu, 2014b). 
Economic prosperity and income-levels are instrumental in the quality of government (Asongu, 
2012, p. 191). The sign of inflation on governance remains ambiguous. It may be positive if 
measures put in place are designed to effectively improve government quality and correct the 
problem. On the other hand, it could substantially affect governance standards negatively if issues 
of soaring food prices remain unaddressed. The latter are among factors that culminated to the 
Arab Spring (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). We also employ time-effects in the specifications to 
further control for the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 Definition of the variables is presented in Appendix 1, the summary statistics disclosed in 
Appendix 2 and the correlation analysis in Appendix 3. From the first, the variables are 
comparable and based on the variations we could be confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships would emerge. The correlation analysis has been employed to mitigate 
multicollinearity and overparametization issues that could arise, especially among NODA 
distortion dynamics.  
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2.2 Methodology 
 
 The system GMM estimation strategy is adopted for a threefold interest: first, it accounts 
for potential endogeneity in all the regressors; second, cross-country regressions are eliminated in 
the estimation process and; biases in the difference estimation resulting from small samples are 
mitigated. Hence, it is substantially for this third point that we are consistent with Bond et al. 
(2001, pp. 3-4) in choosing the system GMM approach (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998) instead of the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In the specification, a 
heteroscedasticity-consistent two-step approach is preferred to the homoscedasticity-consistent 
one-step procedure. Two tests are performed to ascertain the validity of the models, notably: the 
Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity and; the Arellano & Bond 
autocorrelation (AR(2)) test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. The interests of 
using data averages in terms of 3 year NOI have already been discussed in the data section.  
 The following equations in levels and first difference represent the GMM approach.    
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j
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 Where: ‘t’ denotes the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. Gov  is Governance; T , Total 
NODA; DAC , NODA from DAC countries; MD , NODA from Multilateral Donors; X is the set 
of control variables (Trade openness, Government expenditure, Inflation and GDP growth); 
i is a country-specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and;  ti ,  an error term. The 
estimation procedure involves jointly estimating the regression in levels (Eq. (1)) with that in 
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first-difference (Eq. (2)), hence exploiting all the parallel or orthogonality conditions between the 
the error term and the lagged endogenous variable.  
 
3. Empirical results  
 
3.1 Confirmation of empirical underpinnings 
 
 As outlined in the introduction, it is relevant to first confirm the findings of Kangoye 
using the same: definition of uncertainty and; corruption as the dependent governance variable. 
The foreign aid distortions are standard errors (standard deviations of the residuals after first-
order autoregressive processes). In Table 1 below, the models are overwhelmingly valid because 
the null hypotheses of the Sargan OIR and AR(2) tests are overwhelmingly rejected
2
. The main 
findings are broadly consistent with the position that foreign aid uncertainty increases corruption. 
In the interpretation, note should be taken of the fact that the CPI is reported in decreasing order 
such that, lower values denote higher levels of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Accordingly, two tests have been performed to investigate the validity of the models, notably:  the Arellano & 
Bond autocorrelation test which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the Sargan-test that 
assesses the over-identification restrictions. The latter test investigates if the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the view that the instruments as a group 
display strict exogeneity or do not suffer from endogeneity.  Overwhelmingly for most models, we have neither 
rejected the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation nor the Sargan null for the validity of the 
instruments.  
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Table 1: Effect of foreign aid distortions on corruption  
       
 Corruption 
       
Corruption (-1) 0.670*** 0.701*** 0.686*** 0.714*** 0.711*** 0.671*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.802 0.910 0.758 0.858 0.672 0.929* 
 (0.155) (0.120) (0.192) (0.139) (0.252) (0.090) 
NODASD2 (Total) -0.010 -0.003 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.347) (0.801)     
NODADACSD2 --- --- -0.010 0.000 --- --- 
   (0.253) (0.999)   
NODAMDSD2 --- --- --- --- -0.091** -0.103* 
     (0.032) (0.066) 
       
Gov. Expenditure -0.003 -0.0003 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.533) (0.950) (0.633) (0.999) (0.150) (0.689) 
GDP growth  -0.019 -0.005 -0.021 -0.002 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.489) (0.901) (0.437) (0.961) (0.765) (0.921) 
Trade  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.142) (0.325) (0.159) (0.291) (0.124) (0.289) 
Inflation   0.006 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.010 0.007 
 (0.784) (0.911) (0.812) (0.786) (0.501) (0.696) 
       
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.295) (0.405) (0.310) (0.374) (0.299) (0.343) 
Sargan OIR (0.511) (0.238) (0.507) (0.247) (0.654) (0.212) 
Wald  (joint) 819.47*** 267.53*** 598.36*** 273.44*** 883.72*** 259.56*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  15 18 15 18 15 18 
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Observations  69 69 69 69 69 69 
       
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADACSD2:  SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals 
after first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
 
3.2 Requalification of governance  
 
 This section extends the definition of governance from corruption to political, economic, 
institutional and general dynamics. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensions of each governance dynamic because some information may be redundant owing to 
the high degrees of substitution. PCA is a widely employed statistical method that consists of 
reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components that reflect a substantial variation or proportion of initial information. We 
first reduce all the governance indicators to obtained a general governance measurement before 
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further mitigating them into: voce & accountability and political stability for political governance 
(PolGov); government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic governance (EcoGov) 
and; corruption-control and rule of law for institutional governance (InstGov).  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion are employed to determine common 
factors. They recommend stopping at first principal components (PCs) with an eigen value 
greater than the mean (or unity). In this light, as shown in Table 2 below: General governance 
(G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.642 and represents more than 77% of variation in the six 
government variables (regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, rule of 
law, political stability/no violence and voice & accountability); political governance (PolGov) 
summarizes about 82% of information with an eigenvalue of 1.852; economic governance 
denotes more than 90% of information with an eigenvalue of 1.812 and; institutional governance 
represents 93.5% of variability with a 1.871 eigenvalue. Consistent with Andrés et al. (2014), the 
following definitions are relevant to the governance dynamics. (1) Political governance is the 
process by which those in authority are selected and replaced. (2) Economic governance denotes 
the capacity of government to formulate & implement policies as well as deliver services.   (3) 
Institutional governance represents the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern 
the interactions among them.   
Table 2: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  PC 0.297 0.774 -0.369 -0.350 -0.021 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third PC 0.750 -0.300 0.353 -0.127 -0.223 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
          
First PC (PolGov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.170 1.000 0.340 
          
First PC (EcoGov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
          
First PC (InstGov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
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P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political 
Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. PolGov (Political Governance): First 
PC of VA & PS. EcoGov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. InstGov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
  
3.2 Distortions as standard deviations 
 
 Table 3 below assesses the concerns underpinning the paper using the first definition of 
distortions which is the standard deviation of three-year NOI. But for a thin exception (first 
model on general governance with a significant Sargan OIR test), the models are overwhelmingly 
valid because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most 
part. The main findings support the Eubank hypothesis with a positive effect of aid distortions on 
political and general governance. Most of the control variables have the expected though 
insignificant signs.  
   
 
Table 3: Total foreign aid distortions with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.970*** 1.128*** 1.081*** 0.862*** 0.854*** 0.913*** 1.040*** 0.955*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.067 -0.145 -0.041 -0.007 0.048 0.063 0.008 -0.088 
 (0.358) (0.177) (0.701) (0.963) (0.572) (0.673) (0.944) (0.634) 
NODASD1 (Total) 0.006* 0.015* 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.017** 0.017* 
 (0.054) (0.075) (0.251) (0.582) (0.482) (0.350) (0.044) (0.056) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0008 --- 0.009 
  (0.324)  (0.539)  (0.865)  (0.225) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.018 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.217)  (0.240)  (0.786)  (0.383) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0005 --- -0.0003 --- 0.0007 
  (0.831)  (0.668)  (0.797)  (0.634) 
Inflation   --- 0.0009 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0007 
  (0.139)  (0.571)  (0.233)  (0.393) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.550) (0.614) (0.395) (0.701) (0.389) (0.300) (0.524) (0.338) 
Sargan OIR (0.599) (0.290) (0.029) (0.196) (0.115) (0.297) (0.071) (0.252) 
Wald  (joint) 91.426*** 953.30*** 102.44*** 1084.3*** 79.441*** 1339.6*** 168.15*** 3076.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODA S.D1(Total): Distortions by Simple Standard 
Deviation. 
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 In Table 4 below, specifications of Table 3 are replicated with NODA from DAC 
countries (Panel A) and NODA from Multilateral Donors (Panel B). The models in both panels 
are overwhelmingly valid and the underlying Eubank is also confirmed from political and general 
governance perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: DAC and MD foreign aid distortions with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.992*** 1.131*** 1.084*** 0.835*** 0.843*** 0.919*** 1.035*** 0.963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.054 -0.160 -0.044 0.009 0.055 0.081 0.022 -0.081 
 (0.467) (0.140) (0.677) (0.952) (0.526) (0.581) (0.844) (0.670) 
NODADACSD1  0.002 0.019*** 0.016 0.005 0.0009 0.004 0.019* 0.016** 
 (0.541) (0.000) (0.249) (0.714) (0.844) (0.513) (0.092) (0.041) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0007 --- 0.009 
  (0.299)  (0.617)  (0.873)  (0.216) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.019 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.188)  (0.223)  (0.771)  (0.357) 
Trade  --- 0.0003 --- 0.0006 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0006 
  (0.752)  (0.605)  (0.740)  (0.686) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.084)  (0.530)  (0.272)  (0.355) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.646) (0.669) (0.338) (0.682) (0.383) (0.296) (0.560) (0.333) 
Sargan OIR (0.536) (0.281) (0.032) (0.199) (0.120) (0.330) (0.075) (0.244) 
Wald  (joint) 50.416*** 1245.2*** 112.70*** 1085.5*** 48.786*** 1674.0*** 150.14*** 2994*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 55 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
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 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.872*** 1.115*** 1.047*** 0.882*** 0.834*** 0.971*** 1.005*** 0.947*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.078 -0.106 -0.041 -0.037 0.039 0.155 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.284) (0.378) (0.705) (0.807) (0.644) (0.309) (0.904) (0.903) 
NODAMDSD1 0.039*** 0.011 0.025** 0.039 0.013 0.009 0.052*** 0.032 
 (0.000) (0.748) (0.044) (0.422) (0.211) (0.724) (0.000) (0.493) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.390)  (0.646)  (0.711)  (0.283) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.020 --- -0.002 --- 0.017 
  (0.224)  (0.194)  (0.865)  (0.462) 
Trade  --- 0.0001 --- 0.0004 --- -0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.881)  (0.694)  (0.465)  (0.723) 
Inflation   --- 0.0001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.743)  (0.300)  (0.178)  (0.678) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.519) (0.700) (0.605) (0.902) (0.406) (0.339) (0.633) (0.364) 
Sargan OIR (0.562) (0.250) (0.035) (0.319) (0.114) (0.562) (0.059) (0.396) 
Wald  (joint) 59.108*** 733.31*** 156.94*** 1280.6*** 74.766*** 1051.6*** 153.56*** 2885*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADAC SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation.       
 
 
3.3 Distortions as standard errors  
 
 Tables 5-6 below address the underlying problem using standard errors as distortions 
instead of standard deviations. The standard errors are computed as the standard deviations of the 
residuals saved from the first-order autoregressive processes. The Eubank hypothesis is broadly 
confirmed for political and general governance.  
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Table 5: Total foreign aid distortions with standard errors  
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.969*** 1.128*** 1.078*** 0.828*** 0.841*** 0.915*** 1.034*** 0.938*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.057 -0.147 -0.025 0.012 0.055 0.078 0.030 -0.068 
 (0.431) (0.165) (0.815) (0.938) (0.513) (0.593) (0.785) (0.691) 
NODA SD2 (Total) 0.003** 0.012** 0.005 0.002 0.0006 0.002 0.009 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.468) (0.811) (0.804) (0.514) (0.178) (0.167) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0008 --- 0.008 
  (0.333)  (0.633)  (0.861)  (0.238) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.198)  (0.216)  (0.777)  (0.330) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 ---  -0.0004 --- 0.0009 
  (0.845)  (0.573)  (0.775)  (0.529) 
Inflation   --- 0.001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0003 
  (0.119)  (0.457)  (0.267)  (0.689) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.655) (0.673) (0.524) (0.687) (0.381) (0.294) (0.765) (0.307) 
Sargan OIR (0.596) (0.308) (0.024) (0.228) (0.120) (0.350) (0.053) (0.290) 
Wald  (joint) 82.210*** 1065.2*** 84.379*** 1026.0*** 49.500*** 1487.1*** 133.72*** 3105*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODAS.D2 (Total): SD2: Distortions by Standard 
Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
Table 6: DAC and MD foreign aid distortions with standard errors  
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.985*** 1.131*** 1.078*** 0.810*** 0.838*** 0.917*** 1.032*** 0.950*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.050 -0.149 -0.031 0.021 0.056 0.081 0.035 -0.075 
 (0.499) (0.170) (0.771) (0.890) (0.513) (0.573) (0.750) (0.677) 
NODADAC SD2  0.002 0.013** 0.009 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.011 0.010* 
 (0.412) (0.014) (0.389) (0.825) (0.935) (0.564) (0.223) (0.097) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0007 --- 0.008 
  (0.306)  (0.683)  (0.873)  (0.220) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.194)  (0.229)  (0.742)  (0.307) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0007 
  (0.796)  (0.555)  (0.746)  (0.604) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.099)  (0.464)  (0.273)  (0.504) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.681) (0.684) (0.466) (0.659) (0.382) (0.293) (0.778) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR (0.527) (0.288) (0.027) (0.205) (0.125) (0.360) (0.060) (0.269) 
Wald  (joint) 52.18*** 1318.2*** 95.147*** 1019.6*** 37.637*** 1818.7*** 130.29*** 3194.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
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 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.916*** 1.135*** 1.053*** 0.849*** 0.818*** 0.962*** 0.990*** 0.934*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.089 -0.157 -0.047 -0.002 0.044 0.141 -0.013 -0.029 
 (0.243) (0.149) (0.682) (0.989) (0.596) (0.343) (0.913) (0.852) 
NODAMD SD2 0.042*** 0.043 0.020 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.048*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.116) (0.111) (0.807) (0.385) (0.612) (0.000) (0.591) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.345)  (0.570)  (0.713)  (0.229) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.021 --- -0.002 --- 0.019 
  (0.257)  (0.166)  (0.890)  (0.408) 
Trade  --- 0.000 --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.977)  (0.569)  (0.489)  (0.593) 
Inflation   --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.261)  (0.304)  (0.210)  (0.743) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.762) (0.652) (0.559) (0.765) (0.416) (0.328) (0.654) (0.331) 
Sargan OIR (0.458) (0.347) (0.030) (0.294) (0.125) (0.550) (0.049) (0.370) 
Wald  (joint) 43.24*** 981.65*** 92.29*** 1052.5*** 35.313*** 1174.1*** 100.18*** 3054.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADACSD2:  SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals 
after first-order autoregressive processes. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
 The Kangoye (2013, TDE) findings on the negative nexus between foreign aid 
unpredictability and governance could seriously affect debates in academic and policy making 
circles. Using the theoretical underpinnings of the celebrated Eubank (2012, JDS) literature, we 
have first confirmed Kangoye’s findings. Then we have extended the concept of governance from 
corruption to political, economic, institutional and general versions of the phenomenon. Findings 
from the extension run counter to those of Kangoye. It follows that in the presence of foreign aid 
uncertainty, governments could be constrained to improve governance standards in exchange for 
or anticipation of more dependence on local revenues. This confirms the Eubank hypothesis that 
aid may dilute the positive appeals of local tax revenues on governance. The empirical evidence 
17 
 
is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two direct policy implications result. 
First, the Kangoye findings for developing countries are relevant for Africa. Second, when the 
concept of governance is not restricted to corruption, the findings become irrelevant for the 
continent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Aid1: NODASD1 (Total)  Distortions of Total NODA by Simple Standard Deviation  Author 
   
Aid 2: NODADACSD1  Distortions of NODADAC by Simple Standard Deviation.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD1 Distortions of NODAMD by Simple Standard Deviation 
 
Author 
Aid1: NODASD2 (Total)  Distortions of Total NODA by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 2: NODADACSD2  Distortions of NODADAC by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD2 Distortions of NODAMD by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
   
Political Stability  Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Voice & Accountability  Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free media.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Political Governance  First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability. The process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
   
Government Effectiveness Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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Regulation Quality  Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Economic Governance  First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness 
and Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to 
formulate & implement policies, and to deliver services.  
              PCA 
   
Rule of Law Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Corruption Control  Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which publicpower is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Institutional Governance  First Principal Component of Rule of Law and 
Corruption-Control. The respect for citizens and the state 
of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
   
General Governance   First principal component of Political Stability, Voice & 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulation 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption-Control.  
PCA 
2   
   
GDP growth  Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Government Expenditure  Government Final Consumption Expenditure(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. NODAMD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors. SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
First Distortions from Total NODA 2.841 6.460 0.001 64.113 250 
First Distortions from Total NODADAC 1.868 4.790 0.0005 44.404 250 
First Distortions from Total NODADMD 1.397 2.712 0.0006 29.353 250 
Second  Distortions from Total NODA 3.409 8.106 0.005 91.927 250 
Second  Distortions from Total NODADAC 2.201 6.333 0.001 68.826 250 
Second  Distortions from Total NODADMD 1.678 2.714 0.000 29.906 250 
Political Governance (PolGov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Economic Governance (EcoGov)  0.049 1.310 -3.019 3.290 254 
Institutional Governance (InstGov)  0.008 1.378 -3.879 3.179 264 
General Governance (G.Gov)  0.108 2.095 -5.139 5.086 254 
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
GDP growth   4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee. SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Distortions by Standard 
Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
                
Control Variables Foreign Aid Distortions Governance   
GDPg Trade Gov.E Inflation SD1Aid1 SD1Aid2 SD1Aid3 SD2Aid1 SD2Aid2 SD2Aid3 PolGov EcoGov InstGov G.Gov  Corruption   
1.000 0.179 0.254 -0.132 0.219 0.193 0.166 0.145 0.091 0.109 -0.012 -0.041 -0.084 -0.049 -0.056 GDPg 
 1.000 -0.070 0.024 0.082 0.050 0.047 0.105 0.091 -0.032 0.202 0.089 0.207 0.174 0.209 Trade 
  1.000 -0.243 0.014 0.024 0.072 0.028 0.028 0.051 -0.040 0.007 0.023 -0.003 -0.095 Gov. E 
   1.000 -0.004 0.011 -0.016 -0.003 0.006 0.016 -0.114 -0.169 -0.136 -0.149 -0.054 Inflation 
    1.000 0.921 0.793 0.949 0.878 0.678 -0.157 -0.293 -0.215 -0.244 -0.130 SD1Aid1 
     1.000 0.528 0.901 0.946 0.459 -0.160 -0.279 -0.224 -0.242 -0.129 SD1Aid2 
      1.000 0.718 0.515 0.902 -0.105 -0.252 -0.157 -0.191 -0.132 SD1Aid3 
       1.000 0.945 0.650 -0.109 -0.251 -0.179 -0.198 -0.118 SD2Aid1 
        1.000 0.452 -0.115 -0.228 -0.182 -0.191 -0.112 SD2Aid2 
         1.000 -0.074 -0.234 -0.153 -0.175 -0.161 SD2Aid3 
          1.000 0.758 0.819 0.901 0.745 PolGov 
           1.000 0.878 0.945 0.822 EcoGov 
            1.000 0.957 0.895 InstGov 
             1.000 0.875 G.Gov  
              1.000 Corruption 
                
GDPg: GDP growth rate. Gov. E: Government Expenditure. Aid1: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). Aid2: NODA from the DAC countries. Aid3: NODA from Multilateral Donors. 
SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  PolGov: Politcal Governance. 
EcoGov: Economic Governance. InstGov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance.  
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